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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
V. : 
ALFRED P. KATOA : Case No. 981699-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for two 
counts of Automobile Homicide, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1) (1995), in the Third 
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Stephen L. 
Henriod, judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred on this 
court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . See 
Addendum A (judgment and conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
I. Did the trial court err in ordering Appellant to serve 
two zero-to-five sentences consecutively rather than 
concurrently? 
Standard of Review: Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. See State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 
(Utah App. 1996) . A sentencing court abuses its discretion "when 
the judge "fails to consider all legally relevant factors.1" Id. 
(quotation omitted). ""An appellate court may only find abuse 
"if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the 
view adopted by the trial court.1" Id. (quotation omitted). 
Preservation: Appellant's motion to correct the sentencing 
court's improper consecutive sentence is preserved on the record 
for appeal ("R.") at 51-53. 
STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statute and constitutional provision are 
determinative of the issue on appeal: 
Article I, Section 9, Utah Constitution (1991) : 
Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with 
unnecessary rigor. 
Concurrent or Consecutive Sentences -- Limitations --
Definition, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1998) : 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been 
adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless 
the court states in the sentence that they shall run 
consecutively. . . . (4) A court shall consider the gravity 
and circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant Alfred P. Katoa ("Katoa") and Aisea Akauloa 
("Akauloa") were speeding in separate cars through a residential 
area. R.4;75[2] (Presentence Investigation Report or "PSR"). 
When Katoa attempted to pass Akauloa, their cars brushed, causing 
each driver to lose control and to collide into a parked flat-bed 
truck and an oncoming car driven by Helen and Robert Sherlin. 
Id. 
Helen Sherlin and two of Katoafs passengers were dead at the 
scene. R.75[3]. Robert Sherlin and another of Katoa's 
passengers died at the hospital. Id. Several others were 
injured. Id. Investigating officers reported that Akauloa's 
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blood alcohol level ("BAL") was 0.11 percent, R.5; Katoa's was 
only 0.02 percent. R.75[3] ;76 [4] . In addition, both Katoa and 
Akauloa tested positive for "metabolite for marijuana with no 
quantitative results." R.75[3]. Katoa admitted that he had 
taken two or three hits from a marijuana cigarette earlier in the 
day, in addition to drinking some beer. R.75[3,15]. The 
probable cause statement listed only alcohol as a contributing 
factor. R.5. 
Katoa and Akauloa were initially charged with five counts of 
criminal homicide, manslaughter, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1995). R.2-5. Katoa 
pleaded guilty to two counts of automobile homicide, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1) 
(Supp. 1998) . R.27-34; see also R.36-39 (amended information 
charging Katoa with two counts of automobile homicide). As part 
of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend concurrent 
sentencing. R.27. 
At the sentencing hearing, Katoa orally argued for two years 
jail time plus probation or, at most, concurrent prison terms. 
R.76 [3,10]. Katoa expressed great remorse for the accident. 
R.76 [4,7,10] . He also reminded the court that he had cooperated 
with the police concerning the accident, speaking to them at the 
hospital willingly without his attorney present; that he remained 
in the jurisdiction to accept responsibility for his crime and 
left Utah only for a brief period to place his wife and children 
in the care of his mother in California in anticipation of his 
3 
incarceration; that he has a good work history and has always 
taken care of his family; that his criminal record was not 
serious and that he did not have any pending charges that 
occurred after the accident; that the speed he was traveling (60 
m.p.h.) was discovered by a separate investigator to be much 
lower than the speed initially indicated by police (79-81 
m.p.h.); and that he requested mediation with the victims' 
families. R.76[5-10]. Katoa also personally apologized to the 
victims' families attending the hearing. R.76[10]. 
The court acknowledged that Akauloa's criminal record and 
BAL at the crime scene was "significantly worse than Mr. Katoa's" 
and that he therefore saw Akauloa as "more culpable" and "in a 
different light" than Katoa. R.76[11,24]. The court went 
further to commend Katoa for "behav[ing] responsibly" and for 
showing "sincere remorse." R.76[23]. 
Nonetheless, the court sentenced Katoa and Akauloa to two 
consecutive zero-to-five prison sentences, noting the "incredible 
damage" caused as a result of their "total disregard for the 
lives and safety of other people." R.76[23-24]. The judge 
premised his decision in part on his finding that Katoa "had been 
arrested, convicted and sentenced for drinking crimes," R.76[24], 
although there was no evidence before the court to this effect 
regarding Katoa. R.75[9-10,14]. The judge also reasoned that 
Katoa and Akauloa caused a great deal of damage, displayed a 
disregard for human life and safety, and had been drinking and 
smoking marijuana just prior to the accident. R.76[24]. 
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Katoa made a written motion to correct the sentence, to wit, 
to change the sentence to concurrent terms. R.51-53. The 
sentencing court denied Katoa's motion. R.58. Katoa appeals 
from the sentencing court's denial of his motion to correct the 
sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING 
KATOA TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES. 
The trial court erred in denying Katoa's motion to correct 
his sentence, to wit, to impose concurrent rather than 
consecutive sentences. Specifically, the trial court abused its 
discretion in sentencing Katoa to two consecutive zero-to-five 
terms where it based its decision in part on a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact and where it did not adequately consider 
mitigating factors in light of the criteria set forth in Utah's 
sentencing statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (Supp. 1998), 
governing the imposition of consecutive sentences. Hence, the 
imposition of consecutive sentences is excessive and unfair in 
light of the circumstances of Katoa's case. See Utah Const. Art. 
1/ § 9 ("[p]ersons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor"); see also State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 
435 (Utah 1993) (Article I, § 9's ""content and limitations [are] 
best explicated on a case by case basis'") (quotation omitted). 
In imposing the consecutive sentences, the court made the 
following findings: 
It is clear that, particularly Mr. Katoa, is not as 
evil as some of the people I see here in court. Mr. 
5 
Akauloa is worse. There is no question, Mr. Akauloa, 
your record shows much more serious criminal activity 
in the past and also this other incident where you were 
lucky you didn't kill anybody, just a couple of years 
before this one. But you both have serious records. 
You both have the kind of prior conduct and the kind of 
consequences of that conduct that should have taught 
you better. Again Mr. Akauloa, more so than Mr. Katoa. 
Since this incident, you both have behaved 
responsibly and appropriately and I am going to give 
you credit for that. I think I am hearing sincere 
remorse. It is too late but it is obviously sincere 
and you obviously care deeply. 
. . . . [Y]ou have caused incredible damage as a direct 
result of your almost absolute and total disregard for 
the lives and the safety of other people. Terrible 
damage. You both had been drinking. You both had been 
smoking marijuana. You both had been arrested, 
convicted and sentenced for drinking crimes and drug 
crimes. 
I do see a difference in prior record and conduct. 
I see Mr. Akauloa as more culpable but not sufficiently 
more culpable to get a different sentence. 
I am going to sentence you each to zero to five 
years on each of the two counts you pled guilty to and 
I am going to send you to prison on each sentence 
consecutive to the other sentences. It will be up to 
the Board of Pardons to determine when you are out. 
R.76 [23-24] ; see also Addendum B (text of sentencing hearing) . 
A. The Trial Court Abused It's Discretion In Imposing 
Consecutive Sentences Because It Did So Based On An 
Erroneous Factual Finding. 
A court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision 
upon a clearly erroneous factual finding. See Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 1991) ("the 
making of a clearly erroneous factual finding is an abuse of 
discretion"). Clear error is to be found by a reviewing court 
when "the factual findings made by the trial court are not 
adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in tt 
evidence in a light favorable to the trial court's 
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determination." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
In the present case, the sentencing court based its 
decision, in part, upon a clearly erroneous factual finding when 
it stated that Katoa previously "had been arrested, convicted and 
sentenced for drinking crimes." R.76[24]. This finding is false 
and wholly unsupported in the record. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-
36. 
A review of Katoa's history as revealed in the Presentence 
Investigation Report ("PSR"), R.75, does not indicate any 
"drinking crimes." R.76[24]. While Katoa has an adult criminal 
history in California, none of the convictions are for any 
offense involving alcohol.1 R.75[9-10]. Moreover, Katoa does 
not have any juvenile or adult criminal record in Utah, let alone 
any convictions for "drinking crimes" in this state. Id. Nor 
were any such charges pending against him at the time of or 
subsequent to the accident. R.75[11]. In fact, the report 
expressly states that Katoa "had no [previous] DUI arrests," 
R.75 [14], and was not legally drunk at the time of the accident, 
having only a .02 blood alcohol level. R.75[3]. At most, the 
PSR states with regard to Katoa's "alcohol history" that he has 
participated in moderate to heavy drinking since a teenager, but 
has never committed any drinking-related offense as a result. 
1
 The California convictions (all misdemeanors), spanning 
from 1989 to 1995, include one conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance, plus various convictions for either 
battery, assault, obstruction/resisting arrest, or vandalism. 
R.75 [9-10]; see also Addendum C (PSR on juvenile record, adult 
record, driving history, probation history, and pending cases). 
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R.75 [14] . 
In light of the foregoing, the sentencing court's finding 
that Katoa "had been arrested, convicted and sentenced for 
drinking crimes" is clearly erroneous in that it is wholly 
unsupported in the record and false on its face. R.76[24]. 
Having premised the consecutive sentence, in part, upon this 
clearly erroneous finding, the trial court abused its discretion, 
requiring reversal of the sentence. See Tolman, 818 P.2d at 27 
(a court abuses its discretion when it renders a decision based 
on clearly erroneous fact findings); Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36 
(clear error exists where finding is unsupported in record). 
B. The Sentencing Court Abused Its Discretion Because The 
Facts Do Not Support Consecutive Sentences. 
The sentencing court likewise abused its discretion because 
the facts of Katoa's case do not support the imposition of 
consecutive sentences. See State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 
(Utah 1998) (vacating consecutive sentences where sentencing 
court "may not have given adequate weight to certain mitigating 
circumstances"); see also State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1302 
(Utah 1993) (vacating consecutive sentences where court did not 
"sufficiently consider" mitigating facts); State v. Smith, 909 
P.2d 236, 244-45 (Utah 1995) (same). 
Section 76-3-401(1) of Utah's sentencing statute provides, 
11
 [a] court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged 
guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to impose 
concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses." "^The 
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statute . . . favors concurrent sentences.1" Galli, 967 P.2d at 
938 (quoting Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301). "In determining whether 
to impose consecutive sentences, the court is required to 
"consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.1" 
Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4)). 
In light of the foregoing factors, a sentencing court abuses 
its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences where it does 
not give adequate consideration to mitigating circumstances.2 
2
 In State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1997), 
this Court determined that in order to show that a sentencing 
court has not duly considered a particular mitigating fact, a 
defendant must establish that it was not included in any of the 
information presented to the court. Id. at 652. Hence, under 
Schweitzer, a sentencing court is deemed to have considered 
information where it is presented through such sources as the 
PSR, oral argument presented by counsel, the defendant, or any 
other party properly before the sentencing court, and/or letters 
written concerning the defendant from parties with an appropriate 
interest in the proceeding (e.g., counselors, victims, family). 
Id. 
Other opinions do not necessarily reflect Schweitzer. If 
anything, case law seems to suggest that a court's awareness of 
mitigating facts is assumed and, in any event, not always 
determinative of whether a court has given them appropriate 
consideration. For example, the Galli Court did not discuss 
whether and how the sentencing court was made aware of the 
mitigating factors that ultimately led to the vacation of the 
consecutive sentences in that case. 967 P.2d at 938. Indeed, 
Galli indicates that the court was likely aware of them through 
any one of a number of sources and yet abused its discretion in 
not ffgiv[ing] [them] adequate weight." Id. Similarly, the 
Strunk Court did not note how or if the sentencing court was 
aware of the mitigating facts that led to the vacation of the 
consecutive sentences at issue there. See 846 P.2d at 1301-02. 
In this case, all the mitigating information that was not 
adequately considered by the sentencing court was nonetheless 
made available to it through various sources, including the PSR; 
arguments presented by Katoa, his attorney, counsel for Akauloa, 
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See id. For example, in Galli, the defendant ("Galli") was 
involved in a string of robberies. Id. at 932. In the first 
robbery, Galli pointed a gun at a bookstore clerk and took 
approximately $250 in cash. Id. In the second robbery, Galli 
and one other man robbed a movie theater attendant at gunpoint of 
$900. Id. In the third robbery, Galli again robbed at gunpoint 
a clerk in a tool store of $180. Id. 
Galli was apprehended in Washington state almost one month • 
after the third robbery occurred. Id. He voluntarily spoke with 
detectives, admitting to all three robberies. Id. Prior to 
trial, while out on bail, Galli "absconded" from the 
jurisdiction. Id. He was captured almost three years later in 
Minnesota and returned to Utah, where he entered guilty pleas to 
three separate charges of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to 
three consecutive five-to-life sentences. Id. 
Looking at each of the statutory factors enumerated in 
section 76-3-401(4), the Court reversed the consecutive 
sentences, stating that the "[jludges . . . may not have given 
adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances." Id. at 
938. As to the gravity and circumstances of the robberies, the 
as well as the prosecutor; and through numerous letters written 
by family of the victims and the defendant. However, in light of 
the foregoing discussion, "adequate consideration" for purposes 
of this appeal is not contingent only upon whether the sentencing 
court had all the mitigating information before it. Rather, 
under Galli and similar case law, the crux of the analysis goes 
to whether the sentencing court's decision to impose consecutive 
sentences reflects that mitigating information such that the 
sentence is not unduly rigorous in violation of section 76-3-401 
and Katoa's rights under Article I, § 9 of the Utah Constitution. 
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Court noted that although Galli used a gun, he did not injure 
anyone and the amount of "money taken . . . was relatively 
small." Id. 
With regard to Galli's criminal history, the Court noted 
that it consisted of only minor traffic offenses. Id. Moreover, 
the Court explained that although Galli had absconded from the 
jurisdiction for three years, the State never charged him with 
"bail jumping." Id. Accordingly, the Court stated that "this 
fact [of bail jumping could not] provide more than nominal 
support for the imposition of consecutive sentences." Id. 
Next, in consideration of Galli's character, the Court 
reasoned that consecutive sentences were not appropriate where 
Galli "voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility for the 
crimes he committed." Id. In addition, the Court noted that 
Galli expressed a "commitment and hope to improve himself," as 
well as recognized that Galli, although a fugitive from justice, 
"obeyed the law [and] helped his neighbors" while in Minnesota 
and thereby demonstrated that he was a "productive individual." 
Id. 
Finally, as to Galli's rehabilitative needs, the Court 
recognized that his good behavior in Minnesota "show[ed] that he 
has the ability to improve himself and become a productive, law-
abiding citizen once he has paid his debt to society." Id.; see 
also Strunk, 846 P.2d at 13 02 (vacating consecutive sentence 
where trial court did not "sufficiently consider defendant's 
rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme youth and the 
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absence of prior violent crimes"). 
As in Galli, there are a number of significant mitigating 
factors in this case. When considered in light of the statutory 
factors enumerated in 76-3-401(4), those factors show that the 
sentencing court's decision to impose consecutive sentences is 
not supported in the record and amounts to an abuse of 
discretion. Indeed, when compared to Galli and other cases 
vacating consecutive sentencing orders, Katoa is more deserving 
of concurrent sentencing. Each of the statutory factors, the 
pertinent mitigating factors and relative case law will be 
addressed in turn. 
Gravity and Circumstances of the Offense: The sentencing 
court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences 
where it failed to adequately consider mitigating facts 
concerning the accident itself. As an initial matter, Katoa's 
case is deserving of concurrent sentencing since there was no 
malice aforethought involved in the car accident. The 
incongruity of the consecutive sentencing order in this case is 
highlighted given that other cases, wherein similar orders were 
vacated, involved intentional crimes. For example, in Galli, the 
defendant deliberately robbed three different businesses, 
threatening people at gunpoint during each incident. 967 P.2d at 
932, 938. Likewise in Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301-02, the same 
Court vacated a consecutive sentence although the defendant 
purposefully kidnaped, sexually assaulted, then murdered a young 
child. See also Smith, 909 P.2d at 244-45 (vacating consecutive 
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sentence although defendant intentionally kidnaped at knife 
point, raped and sodomized young child). 
Katoa's behavior, by contrast, does not amount to the sort 
of malicious or intentional acts involved in Galli, Strunk, or 
Smith. At most, Katoa exercised poor judgment, which, in turn, 
precipitated the accident. An accident, by definition, excludes 
the exercise of intent or malice. Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "accident" as "an event happening without any human 
agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an 
event which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by 
the person to whom it happens." Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.) 
at 15. Although Katoa reminded the court that he did not behave 
with malice in this matter, R.76[3,9], the record of the 
sentencing hearing indicates that the court did not give this 
fact any consideration when it decided to impose consecutive 
sentences and never mentioned the same when it pronounced its 
findings. See R.76 [23-24] (sentencing court findings) (text 
supra; Addendum B). 
In addition, the record indicates that the sentencing court 
focused unduly upon the fact that Katoa "had been drinking . . . 
[and] smoking marijuana." R.76[24]. The court failed, however, 
to acknowledge related mitigating information that actually shows 
Katoa's drinking and smoking to be rather limited and, 
consequently, renders them unlikely contributing factors to the 
accident. For instance, the court failed to acknowledge that 
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Katoa had a BAL of only .02 at the time of the accident and 
therefore was not legally drunk and was fit to drive. R.75f3j . 
Considering that Akauloa's BAL (.11) was over the legal limit, 
Katoa's legal BAL does not warrant consecutive sentences. 
Moreover, the court did not acknowledge that blood samples 
taken from Katoa after the accident showed only a "metabolite for 
marijuana with non quantitative results," id., suggesting that 
whatever amount Katoa inhaled prior to the accident was not 
enough to impair his driving and contribute to the accident. 
Indeed, the probable cause statement listed only alcohol as a 
factor contributing to the accident. R.5. 
Where the court's decision does not adequately reflect the 
mitigating circumstances surrounding the accident itself, the 
court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. 
See Salli. 967 P.2d at 938. 
Katoa's Criminal History: In addition to the discussion in 
Point A supra regarding the court's clearly erroneous factual 
finding of Katoa's non-existent "drinking crimes," R.76[24], the 
sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive 
sentences based on his "serious record [], . . . prior conduct . . 
. that should have taught [him] better . . . [and] drug crimes." 
R.76I23-24J, In actuality,, Katoa's record is minimal and does 
not warrant such a rigorous sentence. 
As a general rule, a defendant's limited criminal record 
weighs in favor of concurrent sentencing, while an extensive 
criminal background, especially one that relates to the current 
14 
offenses, warrants consecutive sentencing. For example, in 
Galli, the Supreme Court vacated the consecutive sentences, in 
part, because the defendant had a relatively insignificant 
criminal history consisting of "minor traffic offenses and one 
misdemeanor theft conviction." 967 P.2d at 938. By the same 
token, this Court upheld consecutive sentences in State v. 
Montoya, 929 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1996), in part, because the 
defendant, convicted of aggravated robbery, kidnaping and 
attempted aggravated kidnaping, had a ""history of aggressive, 
criminal behavior with the gang culture,! including aggravated 
assault, robbery, possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, and battery." Id. at 358,359. 
In light of Galli and Montoya, the sentencing court erred in 
imposing consecutive sentences since Katoa does not have a 
lengthy criminal record, nor a record of offenses demonstrating a 
proclivity for reckless driving. First, as to the court's 
concern over "drug crimes," R.76[24], Katoa has only one prior 
misdemeanor conviction for possession of a controlled substance, 
which occurred in California in 1995. R.75 [9-10]; see also 
Addendum C (PSR concerning criminal history). He has not had a 
drug-related conviction since that time. Id. Accordingly, the 
sentencing court's concern over Katoa's "drug crimes" is 
exaggerated and seems to miss the fact that he actually has only 
one such conviction which occurred four years ago in another 
jurisdiction. 
The court's characterization of Katoa's record as "serious" 
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is also exaggerated in light of the actual information presented 
in the PSR. R.76[23]. Like the defendant in Galli, 967 P.2d at 
938, Katoa has a history consisting only of misdemeanor offenses 
in California. R.75[9-10]. Moreover, Katoa has no adult 
criminal history in Utah, no juvenile record in California where 
he grew up, and no charges that were pending at the time of the 
accident. R.75[9-11]. 
With regard to Katoa's record, the court also stated that it 
was the "kind of prior conduct . . . that should have taught 
[him] better." R.76[23]. None of the prior offenses, however, 
relate to or otherwise show a history of reckless driving. 
R.75[9-10]. In fact, the PSR states that Katoa has " [n] o 
citations" for traffic violations. R.75[ll], Akauloa, on the 
other hand, does have a history of reckless driving, including 
one incident that almost caused serious injury. R.75[23]. 
Accordingly, the court's suggestion that Katoa has a history of 
reckless driving and that he should have learned from such a 
history is unfounded in the information before the court at the 
time it rendered its decision. Especially when compared with 
Akauloa's demonstrated history of reckless driving, Katoa's lack 
of driving-related offenses underscores the court's failure to 
adequately consider mitigating factors warranting concurrent 
sentences in this case. See Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. 
Katoa's Character: With regard to Katoa's character, the 
judge stated, "you [] have behaved responsibly and appropriately 
and I am going to give you credit for that. I think I am hearing 
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very sincere remorse. It is too late but it is obviously sincere 
and you obviously care deeply." R.76[23]. Despite this 
statement, the court abused its discretion in imposing 
consecutive sentences where other factors concerning Katoa's good 
character and responsible behavior were not given adequate 
consideration by the judge. See Galli, 967 P.2d at 938 (vacating 
consecutive sentence based, in part, upon defendant's good 
character). 
For instance, Katoa cooperated with the investigation of the 
accident, admitting his involvement and voluntarily speaking to 
police without an attorney present while still at the hospital. 
R.76[5]; see Galli, 967 P.2d at 938 (noting that defendant 
"voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility for the 
crimes"). In addition, Katoa, feeling deep remorse, offered to 
participate in mediation with the victims' families and did not 
contest his responsibility to pay restitution. R.76[10]; cf. 
Deli, 861 P.2d at 435 (affirming consecutive sentence where 
defendant did not show ""genuine sympathy and compassion1"). 
Katoa also demonstrated a good character in the manner in 
which he has cared for his girlfriend and their children (three 
at the time of the accident, with one more child on the way). He 
has always supported them financially. R.75[12-13]. In 
anticipation of incarceration, just prior to sentencing, Katoa 
moved them to California to live with his mother rather than 
leaving them to fend for themselves without any financial or 
family support in Utah. R.76[6,21]. After doing so, he promptly 
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returned to Utah to accept responsibility for the accident. 
R.76[6]; cf. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938 (vacating consecutive 
sentence although defendant was a fugitive from justice because 
he demonstrated responsible behavior while away). 
As a final matter, Katoa has demonstrated an ability to 
"improve himself," Galli, 967 P.2d at 938, as well as good 
citizenship in general to the extent that he has not been 
involved in the criminal system since he moved to Utah in 1995 
and has a consistent work history since 1991, except for brief 
periods in 1993 and 1997. R.75[9-15]. Consequently, the 
likelihood that he would continue to become a more "productive 
individual" and a good citizen after the accident is evident and 
bears against the need for consecutive sentencing in this matter. 
Galli, 967 P.2d at 93 8 (noting defendant's demonstrated good 
behavior, albeit while absconding from the jurisdiction). 
Katoafs Rehabilitative Needs: The sentencing court further 
abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences insofar 
as they "are not in accord with [Katoa's] rehabilitative needs." 
Id. 
As noted above, Katoa has expressed genuine remorse and has 
taken responsibility for the accident. R.76[10]. He has shown a 
great level of concern and maturity given that he resettled his 
family in California where they would be well-cared for, and then 
returned to Utah to accept responsibility in this matter. 
R.76 [6-10] . He has also proved himself to be a good citizen and 
capable of self-improvement given his clean record since he moved 
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to Utah in 1995 and his overall work history. R.75 [9-15] . 
Moreover, Katoa's record is relatively minor and does not evince 
a pattern of reckless driving, suggesting that this incident 
truly was an accident and not likely to be repeated. R.75 [9-11] . 
Finally, it suggests that Katoa's behavior on this occasion is 
not the sort of ingrained behavior that requires extensive prison 
time to "rehabilitate" or reverse. 
Consecutive sentences are likewise inappropriate in this 
case since neither the PSR nor the court suggest in any way that 
Katoa is a continuing threat to society and therefore in need of 
lengthy incarceration. R.75,76. In a number of sentencing 
cases, a diagnostic report's or trial court's conclusion that a 
defendant would present a risk to society if paroled is a 
persuasive factor in support of consecutive sentences. For 
example, in Montoya, this Court upheld a consecutive sentence 
where the trial court found that the defendant had had ""previous 
opportunities, several opportunities for rehabilitation as a 
juvenile and an adult, and these unfortunately did not succeed.1" 
929 P.2d at 360; see also Deli, 861 P.2d at 435 (affirming 
consecutive sentence where court found that ""society is at risk 
if defendant should ever be allowed release'"); State v. 
Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah App. 1997) (with respect to 
defendant's rehabilitative needs, finding that defendant was 
""clear and present danger'" supported consecutive sentences). 
Unlike Montoya, Katoa does not have a history of failed 
attempts at rehabilitation; indeed, he does not have any history 
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related to this offense upon which such a conclusion could be 
fairly premised. See supra p.14-15 (discussing Katoa's criminal 
history). Moreover, neither the PSR nor the court made the sort 
of negative prognostication regarding Katoa's rehabilitative 
prospects that factored into the decisions to affirm in Montoya, 
Schweitzer, or Deli. Accordingly, when viewed in light of the 
case law, the court's imposition of consecutive sentences is not 
in accord with Katoa's rehabilitative needs and therefore amounts 
to an abuse of discretion. See Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. 
In light of the foregoing mitigating factors as they relate 
to the criteria set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 for the 
imposition of consecutive sentences, "no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the court." Montoya, 929 P.2d at 
358. Indeed, as compared with Galli and other cases vacating 
similar consecutive sentencing orders, Katoa is even more 
deserving of concurrent sentencing. Consequently, the imposition 
of consecutive sentences is incongruous, not reflective of the 
circumstances of this case, and amounts to an abuse of discretion 
and an unduly rigorous punishment in violation of Katoa's right 
under Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution. See Galli, 
967 P.2d at 938. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Katoa respectfully requests this 
Court to vacate the consecutive sentences imposed below and 
remand for resentencing of concurrent terms. 
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Monday, July 20, 1998 Video transcription 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
VOICE: Are you calling these together, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: I prefer to do them together. 
Anybody object to having them together? 
MR. LEMCKE: The State has no objection. 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: No, objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. We will start with Ms. Kreeck 
Mendez on Mr. Katoa. Is there anything in the Presentence 
Report that ought to be corrected? 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Allen, how about in 
Akauloa? 
MR. ALLEN: Nothing, other than the few things I 
mentioned in my statement. Nothing of a major 
significance. 
THE COURT: Then let's go ahead and address 
sentencing. Let me hear again from Ms. Kreeck Mendez 
first and then Mr. Allen. 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: Your Honor, if I might 
approach. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: I would ask if -- this is a 
tox report and I'd ask that it be included in the file. I 
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would like to handle the business end of that first before 
we get into what we call "more emotional." 
I have submitted these because there is a real, 
very real possibility of prison today. I have submitted 
this and the accident reconstructionist's statement. I 
will be the only lawyer Alfred can ever have. He will 
never be able to afford a lawyer in this case. There is 
already a civil litigation pending. I am submitting these 
because I think they may make a difference to the parole 
board, if that is in fact what happens here, and the 
parole board only considers on their first review the 
matters that are in the file. Additionally, I want the 
court file to fully reflect the situation in this case 
because there is going to be litigation. I know there 
will be restitution orders, but there is an insurance 
company that has already filed an action and served 
Alfred in this matter. 
I will ask the families of the victims here and 
the victims and the court to please be patient. I would 
like to remind everyone that I have a job to do and my job 
is not discounting the victims but to present Alfred's 
position, his side, his feelings on this, fully and 
completely. So as I am going through statements and it 
may sound like I am minimizing the tragedy that occurred 
here, I am not. The police investigated from their 
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perspective. We investigated from Alfred's perspective. 
The tragedy here has never been questioned by anyone at 
all, but I need to make the record and I need to present 
the full picture here so we have what the police 
investigated, in addition to what Alfred has talked to me 
about, and what our investigator came up with. 
I tell you right upfront, Your Honor, what I 
would prefer the court to do is to give Alfred two years 
in jail. No credit for time served. No good time and 
have him completely serve those, and then he be placed on 
probation after that. The matrix is an alternative 
recommendation and in any other case I would feel 
confident that that is the way the court would go. 
However, the tragedy is immense here, but I would ask the 
court to please keep that recommendation in mind. If the 
court is not inclined to go that way, we would ask at 
least for a concurrent sentence in this matter. 
These cases are probably the hardest for me to 
work with, these alcohol-related accidents or accidents of 
any kind because you don't have malice. You don't have 
people running around in anger, and everybody, it is a 
tragedy. Alfred's friends and family go gone. He has 
made his remarks to some people personally, some of the 
victims, some of the victim's family. He wants to make 
some remarks today at the close of my arguments to those 
4 
people he hasn't talked to before. 
I think it is critical that we let the court 
know and the family know that our investigation indicated 
that the speed was substantially less than the police 
indicated and as you saw in the accident reconstruction 
comments. It was still in excess of the appropriate speed 
there, particularly in light of the fact that it was a 
busy day, that the street was crowded. They were not 
racing. 
THE COURT: How about the police findings that 
they were actually smashing into each other car? 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: Well, that is my next point 
is, what happened here is they were not drag racing. 
Aisea passed, Alfred passed, they were losing control of 
each other. There is no doubt that their behavior was 
irresponsible. And we have this tox report where there is 
not a lot of alcohol. It is .02, but it doesn't excuse 
the extreme conduct here that should not have been 
occurring. 
At every meeting I have had with Alfred, every 
meeting, he talks about how this was completely avoidable. 
That he should not have been trying to get back around 
Aisea. They shouldn't have been even passing there, and 
he knows that. And so when I talk about these things, I 
want the specifics known but it is not that Alfred says he 
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didn't do anything wrong. He set into motion a tremendous 
tragedy here, a busy day, a parked semi, a lot of people 
and an enormous, enormous tragedy. One of the worst in 
our valley's history as far as car accidents go. 
I want to make it clear. In the report it 
talks about how he doesn't have much memory. That is not 
from alcohol. Alfred was extremely injured in this whole 
case, and some pieces have come back. I remember talking 
to him in the jail shortly after the accident occurred, 
and him talking about, "I remember the trees waving." 
That is his memory of the accident initially. 
The officer said that he hasn't been helpful. 
I don't know how he can say that and listen to the tape. 
He talked in the hospital while he was still injured. He 
didn't ask for a lawyer, and he knew he could ask for a 
lawyer. They told him that. He spoke in the hospital 
with officers. They came into his house when he was 
convalescing after being at home. Alfred has significance 
ties to Tonga. He could have walked at any time. He had 
family who was willing to help him. He has ties in 
California. As a matter of fact, he was in California. 
He could have walked at any time but he has throughout 
been here and been prepared to take responsibility for 
this case. 
Which brings me to, I would like to thank the 
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court and Ms. Stoic (phonetic) and the victims who allowed 
us to continue that. When Alfred was picked up on traffic 
warrants in California, which dated back to '90 and '94, 
this was continued. Those were all cleared. He came back 
up here. The reason he is in California, and I know that 
the media was concerned about that, is Alfred is 
realistic. While I am asking for two years on probation 
and then probation, even at that he cannot provide for his 
family. He got out on bond and stayed in jail for quite a 
period of time. He got out on a property bond and he has 
been working and putting money away, and he moved his 
family, his three children and his common-law wife down to 
California to live with his mother, to be where they can 
be supported and cared for, knowing that that means, for 
whatever period of incarceration he must go through, there 
will be no contact from them. As a matter of fact, he 
said, "I don't want my children to see me in prison 
because it is more important what happens with them than 
what happens with me." 
I think that shows the kind of person that Alfred 
is. I think it shows what he has done. This event has 
been a life-changing experience for him, as it has been 
for everyone in the audience here today. A tremendous 
loss. A loss of his physical work. He will be able to 
work but not at the level he once was. A loss of family 
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and friends. A loss of a sense of peace. He will never 
be able to live this down. Ever. And in all of our 
conversations he has talked about that. 
We ask to do medication in this case and I 
don't think the families are quite ready for it, as much 
for Alfred as for them, to tell them how he feels. He 
wants the families to know that even if he goes to prison, 
that offer is always available. In mediation they can 
yell at him. They can talk to him. They can do whatever 
they want. They have a social worker sitting there that 
is working with the victim. It can be a tremendous outlet 
and actually I thought it would help Alfred because he 
can't forgive himself. He is having a very hard time with 
that. I have never worked with a client with a greater 
remorse for greater understanding in the situation. 
We would ask the court to have a restitution 
hearing in this matter. There is a lot still out there 
and he is not going to have representation. If the court 
decides to send him to prison, he will not have 
representation before the Board of Pardons. 
Alfred --a lot of people would say, "That is a 
lot of money. I'll never pay it." Alfred's comments 
throughout have always been -- There is an insurer in this 
case. There is a debate as to whether the vehicle is 
still insured. Whether it was in fact lapsed or just at 
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that midway period. That is why they filed suit against 
Alfred. 
So there are some issues that I would ask that we 
present to this court. I believe we probably can work it 
out with Mr. Lemcke but should the court decide prison is 
appropriate in this case, I would not want him to go to 
prison with an open ended figure. I don't think that 
would be fair to anyone. We would like to at least have 
some resolution so we would ask this court. 
Finally, I have probably the biggest request in 
this case. Of all the things I have seen, Alfred is 
probably one of the best father's I have ever known. He 
is very concerned and I think that is where his remorse 
and his understanding and empathy for the victims come 
from because he is such a good family person. He loves 
his kids. His wife is due on April 13th. She typically 
have her babies two weeks early. I would ask the court to 
consider setting this sentence over until she has the baby 
and have him respond. 
THE COURT: You mean August instead of April? 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: August, I am sorry. August 
the 13th. We know that all the other victims are not 
going to see their children. They are not going to see 
these events. We know that and we empathize with that, 
but we would ask the court to consider, in light of the 
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fact this case is not a case of malice. It is a case of 
irresponsibility. A case of numerous factors coming 
together all at once. Not all in Aisea's control. Not 
all in Alfred's control. Granted, Alfred had the 
principal control here, but the catastrophic nature of 
this event came from many, many factors coming together, 
and we would ask the court to consider that. 
Should he go to prison, the Board of Pardons 
would have ample time to work with him, even if they make 
him serve most of the sentence, four and a half years, 
they would still be able to keep him on parole after that 
for a considerable period of time. It would put him in a 
position to be paying money back more quickly and that is 
important for some of these people. A lot of the victims 
didn't respond and I don't know why that is, but those are 
the very victims that I think. And some of them are truly 
sympathetic with Mr. Gotay (phonetic) and he has made his 
peace one-on-one with them. But these people still need 
money. 
Alfred is capable of making money. He is good 
at making a lot of money and putting it away to try and 
take care of his family right now. I know the rest of the 
families need some care. 
We would ask that you at least sentence this 
concurrently. That we give the Board plenty of time to 
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work with this and punishment in light of the facts. That 
is the State's recommendation as a concurrent. I think 
the State and myself more than anyone and Mr. Allen have 
delved into this case knowing the nuances of the case, 
know the facts of this case. There is a lot going on. 
That is not to minimize Alfred's control. There is a lot 
going on. 
Alfred would like to address the court and the 
victims. Would you want him to do that now or after 
hearing from the State? 
THE COURT: Now is fine. 
MR. KATOA: This is a harder time for me. I am 
happy that I got this opportunity to say these things. To 
the families that were involved, to everyone that had me 
come up with them because of the situation, I know that 
sorry is inadequate. (Unintelligible) hours back. 
I know that sorry is just so inadequate. I 
know each and every one of you, if I could I would replace 
their lives with mine. I don't want you to think that I 
did this not caring, not thinking maybe, but absolutely 
not caring. 
If I knew the outcome of that day, I would have 
never acted in that way as I did. I just want to say I am 
sorry to each and every one of you that have lost. 
I can tell you, I would like for mediation. 
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That would be easier for me if I did this, hear from you, 
and let you vent your frustrations towards me. Again, I 
am sorry. 
THE COURT: Mr. Lemcke, did you want to argue now 
or let Mr. Allen go first? 
MR. LEMCKE: I will let Mr. Allen go first, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Allen. 
MR. ALLEN: Uh, I would echo many of the things 
that Ms. Kreeck Mendez said with regard to the recommended 
matrix and with regard to willingness to have a mediation 
to discuss things and also with regard to the restitution 
hearing. 
THE COURT: Mr. Akauloa's record is significantly 
worse than Mr. Katoa's. Mr. Akauloa had a very similar 
incident within just a couple of years of this incident. 
He also had a much higher blood alcohol level than Mr. 
Katoa. Frankly, I see them in a little different light. 
You might want to address those things. 
MR. ALLEN: Well, uh, it is hard to respond. You 
are right that there are those prior things there and 
those reflect poorly on Aisea. All I can offer is that, 
uh, apparently he didn't learn his lesson and he 
understands that that means that he may have a stiffer 
punishment. He is very sorry. He accepts responsibility 
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for this. He wishes he could do something to right the 
wrong. 
He has tried to cooperate from the beginning. 
He gave a full statement to the detective immediately 
following, without an attorney. He pleaded guilty at 
another stage to the counts to which he has pleaded 
guilty, and with the recommendation of the concurrent 
sentences from the prosecution. 
He did undergo a treatment course on his own 
for alcohol earlier this year. Of course, none of this 
makes amends for what happened. 
I would offer to the court that Aisea is young. 
And the other comment that I have is that he is married to 
his wife Josephine who is here today and that they are, I 
mentioned this in my witness statement, they are expecting 
a little boy and I would ask the court to consider the 
impact of added years of separation on that child. 
Aisea wants to address the court and the 
victims. Just in conclusion, he is extremely sorry for 
what happened and is prepared to receive his judgment. 
THE COURT: Okay. You want to go ahead, 
Mr. Akauloa. 
MR. AKAULOA: First of all, to the families of 
Robert and Helene Sherlin, Amanki Moala, Selanito Sitani, 
and Sione Pilivi, I truly am sorry. I accept full 
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responsibility for the things I have done that has caused 
this great tragedy. I know apologies can't bring nothing 
back. But as I am standing here, not a day goes by that I 
don't think about the victims. 
My thoughts are earlier, if I could have gave 
my life for all of them to live, I would in a heart beat, 
the job that I have. I truly am sorry. If not today, 
sometime if you find in your heart to forgive me, I would 
like the mediation hearings where .we can vent our 
frustrations. 
Secondly, I would like to apologize to my 
family. Also thank them for standing by me at this time. 
That is it. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Lemcke. 
MR. LEMCKE: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor 
there are, I have been informed, three members of the 
Sherlin family who asked to address the court. Is the 
court inclined to hear them? 
THE COURT: Certainly. If you folks would like 
to stand up and --
MR. LEMCKE: Go up to the podium if you would and 
identify yourself by name for the record and your 
relationship to the victims in this case. 
THE COURT: I want to tell you folks, I have read 
all of the letters that were submitted to me and there 
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were many that were very positive about your parents. I 
have also viewed the video which you prepared. 
VOICE: My name is Robert Sherlin. I am the 
oldest son of Robert and Helene Sherlin. I would like to 
share with you, some of this would be redundant from the 
letters, but I would like the defendants to hear it as 
well. I will try not to take too much time in my 
comments. 
The day the accident took place, the day my 
mother was killed, was my wife and I's 15th wedding 
anniversary, which has stolen the joy from that day away 
from us forever. Mom died at the accident scene; dad died 
a week later. We stayed beside him. He never woke from 
his coma. After discussing the matter with the ICU 
physician, the surviving children made a decision to turn 
dad's life support off. We were with him as he expired. 
At least we got to tell him good-bye and to hold him. 
That was not a possibility with my mother. Her injuries 
were too severe to allow us to ever see her again. The 
last time I ever saw her was at the Salt Lake airport as 
we were leaving from Christmas to return to our home in 
Houston. Hugging and waving good-bye, if I had only known 
what was going to happen, I would have stayed longer. 
Bob and Helene are gone because of these men's 
criminal acts. What happened was in no way an accident. 
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I have heard it characterized that way. What they did is 
the equivalent of firing a loaded gun haphazardly into a 
crowd. Does the fact that the gunman did not take actual 
aim, wasn't his responsibilities for his actions? No, the 
death of my parents was not an accident. Both of these 
men behaved in an extremely reckless and deadly fashion. 
Either one of them could have backed down and behaved in a 
rationale and civilized fashion. Neither did. 
I submit that the (inaudible) accident which 
could have resulted from their behalf was if they 
accidentally had not killed someone. These individuals 
you have no place in society. They took the lives of my 
parents and through others. I understand that they have a 
arrests in the past. That was brought up. Sadly for my 
mom and dad, it appears no lessons were learned from their 
past mistakes. I am concerned that none will be learned 
this time. 
They have failed to accept the most fundamental 
responsibilities that our society requests of its members. 
They were racing at high speeds down residential streets, 
they drove recklessly down the wrong side of these 
streets, they climbed behind the wheel while drunk, 
neither owned the car they were driving, neither had auto 
insurance. My family, my parents' estate is now under 
attack by insurance companies trying to recoup monies lost 
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from this accident. Money means nothing to us. 
I don't want these people's money. 
Based on all of this, I would request that the 
two defendants receive the maximum penalty possible under 
law. This will not serve to punish them for what they 
have done. It will serve to punish them but it also 
protects society for the brief period they will be away. 
I realize the punishment of these men will not bring my 
parents back, however, their sentencing will serve an 
important step toward my family's closure to this whole 
tragedy. 
I also have a letter here from my 13-year-old 
daughter expressing her loss at these men's, but you have 
received that letter from them. I prefer to just read 
just the very first paragraph for the defendants, if that 
is okay with you, Your Honor. I don't want to take too 
much time here. 
This is the words of my 13-year-old daughter 
(inaudible): "I have been through many things since 
July 4, 1997. I celebrated my grandma's birthday without 
her. I celebrated Thanksgiving without my grandparents. 
I tried to have a mere Christmas without them. I turned 
13 without my grandmother to talk to. I celebrated a new 
year. I went to my first dance. 
I have been through many other painful 
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occurrences since July 4th. My grandmother died. My 
grandfather was in a coma for six days; he died. I went 
to my first two funerals, within a week of each other. 
They are people I deeply loved. I have gone through this 
due to the actions of two people. They killed my grandma 
and my grandpa and part of my life." 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Sherlin. 
VOICE: My name is Carol Hillard. I am Helene 
and Robert's daughter. It is impossible to describe to 
you the impact that their death has had on me and my 
family in the last year. You would have to see the anger 
in the book each day when we get mad at each other for 
every little thing. We have to continue to remind 
ourselves it is not our fault that this happened. Someone 
else killed them. You would have to feel the physical 
pain and heaviness on my chest to realize they are really 
gone and I will never be able to talk to them, laugh with, 
look to them for advise, understanding and support. 
I will never be able to touch or hug them again. And that 
pain I cannot describe to you. 
You would have to be there in the middle of the 
night when I lay in bed and cry for all the things about 
them I miss so desperately and the emptiness that I feel. 
It is unbearable. You would have to be there when I have 
nightmares of the accident and relive every moment from 
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the time my brother called me to each of my parent's 
funerals. It is a nightmare that will never go away and 
will be with me for the rest of my life. You would have 
to be there to see the look in my son's eyes when we talk 
about grandma and grandpa and all the special things that 
they did together; all the things that they shared. He 
was robbed of these two wonderful people being part of his 
life, to share in his achievements and to support him in 
his failures. It has left a huge whole in his young life 
and it is hard to explain to him why this had to happen. 
It didn't have to happen. 
Either of these people could have stopped this 
accident at any time. Both of them were barely at the 
legal limit of alcohol. They had more control than they 
cared to admit. These two people that killed my parents 
have continued to be in trouble with the law even after 
the accident. You would think that in some way they would 
try to give something back to society after the horrible 
devastation that they caused. They have not chosen to do 
so. They say "actions speak louder than words," and I see 
no indication of good intent. I can't help but be made to 
think that if they had to take responsibility for crimes 
and not passed, my parents and the other three victims 
would still be alive. 
I ask you to give these people the maximum 10 
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years in prison, to make them really think their path in 
life. To keep them out of society and insure that no one 
else has to go through what the nightmare my family has 
had to go through, and the families of the other victims. 
I just no, Your Honor, if there is any question about the 
speed, just seeing the accident and the destruction on the 
car, there should be no question as to how fast these 
people were going. They know how important it is being 
parents and why are my parents were such a huge part of my 
life and I am sorry it doesn't take that back. Thank you. 
VOICE: (William Sherlin) I am the William 
Sherlin man. I am the youngest child of Robert and 
Helene and at 33 when they died, they were not only my 
parents, they were people I knew. They were good people. 
They were as law abiding as you could ever want people to 
be. And I know that these men will lives with their 
deaths, But at least they will live. Giving them the 
maximum that they have bargained for isn't nearly enough. 
There was a mistake that was not intent but the result is 
still the same and we still don't have our parents, our 
friends and the friends of many people in this courtroom. 
And I just ask that this is not the time to slap them on 
the wrist, not the time to give them a warning, and not 
the time to say that "I hope you have learned from this." 
This is a time to give them the maximum and I hope you 
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feel that way too. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Lemcke, were there 
any other victims that wish to speak. 
MR. LEMCKE: (inaudible) Let me ask, are there 
any representatives of the family Sione Pilivi that would 
like to speak? (Pause) Are there any representatives of 
the family of Selanito Sitani who would like to speak. 
(Pause) Are there any representatives of the family of 
Amanki Moala who would like to speak. (Pause) 
Your Honor, a couple of mechanical matters 
first. One, on the restitution, counsel is correct that 
they are entitled to a restitution hearing. I don't 
believe that in terms of the equities and the subrogations 
of the various insurers that are involved, that would be 
before us at a restitution hearing. I think that the 
absolute amount of damage would be; but in terms of 
whether or not one of the cars was in lapse or insured, 
that is not for us. That is for a different forum to 
examine. 
Counsels do correctly state our recommendations 
in this case. 
When you have three major factors that a 
prosecutor will argue to a judge in terms of sentence, one 
of them is past record, one of them is quality of conduct, 
and one is the extent of the damage done. And in this 
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case even had there been no past record, even had the 
quality of the conduct been almost benign, nonetheless the 
third factor, the amount of damage done, there were five 
people killed here. There was Helene Sherlin was killed 
here. Robert Sherlin was killed here. Sione Pilivi was 
killed here. Selanito Sitani was killed here, and Amanki 
Moala was killed here, a year this coming Friday on our 
State Holiday. The extent of the damage done makes this a 
present case. 
The question I believe is before Your Honor is 
the question of consecutive vs. concurrent. As you 
stated, the records are not equal here of the two 
defendants, and further, although it may seem that it is 
punishing to Mr. Katoa, his wife, perhaps more so than to 
him, I would ask the court to go ahead and sentence today, 
get the sentences started today, simply because this case 
needs some finality. 
THE COURT: Ms. Kreeck Mendez, Mr. Allen, any 
final words? 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: Your Honor, I would just like 
to clarify, and in all honesty it is more for it is going 
to be in the newspaper tomorrow, than anything else. 
There has been no continuing criminal. Alfred moved his 
family to California. He was riding with someone else who 
had a car violation, an equipment violation. As is 
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standard practice, you need a license and information is 
taken on both people and Alfred had old warrants. There 
has been no continuing criminal activity. 
THE COURT: Mr. Akauloa has at least a pending 
charge of activity subsequent to this. 
MS. KREECK MENDEZ: As to the restitution, I am 
in complete agreement with Mr. Lemcke and I in no way want 
to pull out civil (inaudible) . As I told you, there is a 
civil matter pending, but I do want a firm number to go 
forward with whatever happens after this, particularly 
where we are dealing with the Board of Pardons. The Board 
of Pardons, their restitution hearings are much different 
than what is available here. I can work with Mr. Lemcke 
and we can get a firm figure to go forward with. That can 
be handled in whatever situation you place Mr. Katoa in 
today. 
And finally, I know it is hard for the victims 
and Alfred is not really expecting you to give him his 
extra time. Christy would very much like him to be there 
for the birth. He has been there for the birth of each of 
his other three children. And Alfred said he would just 
ask. So it is not that he expects it. He knows it is 
huge. 
THE COURT: You have asked. Mr. Allen. 
MR. ALLEN: The expected date, as I say, is quite 
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a ways off. So we haven't asked (inaudible) because of 
that. I would just reiterate what I said before. 
THE COURT: Well, this is a difficult case from 
my perspective as I started reviewing it, and I am not 
going to give a lecture today. I don't see any point in 
that. 
It is clear that, particularly Mr. Katoa, is not 
as evil as some of the people I see here in court. 
Mr. Akauloa is worse. There is no question, Mr. Akauloa, 
your record shows much more serious criminal activity in 
the past and also this other incident where you were lucky 
you didn't kill anybody, just a couple of years before 
this one. But you both have serious records. You both 
have had the kind of prior conduct and the kind of 
consequences of that conduct that should have taught you 
better. Again Mr. Akauloa, more so than Mr. Katoa. 
Since this incident, you both have behaved 
responsibly and appropriately and I am going to give you 
credit for that. I think I am hearing very sincere 
remorse. It is too late but it is obviously sincere and 
you obviously care deeply. 
Mr. Lemcke mentioned the three areas that 
compare. Starting with the worst one, no matter what your 
daily lives are like and your families are like, you have 
caused incredible damage. You have caused incredible 
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damage as a direct result of your almost absolute and 
total disregard for the lives and the safety of other 
people. Terrible damage. You both had been drinking. 
You both had been smoking marijuana. You both had been 
arrested, convicted and sentenced for drinking crimes and 
drug crimes. 
I do see a difference in prior record and 
conduct. I see Mr. Akauloa as more culpable but not 
sufficiently more culpable to get a different sentence. 
I am going to sentence you each to zero to 5 
years on each of the two counts you pled guilty to and I 
am going to send you to prison on each sentence 
consecutive to the other sentences. It will be up to the 
Board of Pardons to determine when you are out. 
This order is also going to include a full 
restitution order and I am going to leave that issue open 
for a period of 12 months and I am going to award a 
$500.00 recoupment fee on each case. That is to pay for 
the services of your attorneys. They will be forthwith 
sentences. You will both go in today. 
(Hearing concluded) 
* * * * * * * 
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ADDENDUM C 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
KATOA, ALFRED P. 
LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: (continued) 
Detective Casanova expresses the opinion that, although both defendants seem remorseful at 
present and may be basically good individuals, neither has been totally cooperative during the 
investigation of this case. Both admitted only to those things which were already known and 
attempted to shift as much responsibility as possible away from themselves. Neither of the 
defendant's vehicle was covered by liability insurance and neither of them are prepared to 
cover the expense resulting from this accident. He believes the defendants have already 
received all consideration they might deserve in this matter by the reduction in the charges 
against them and suggests consecutive sentencing is in order. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
Detective Arman Casanova, Investigating Officer 
JUVENILE RECORD: 
Mr. Katoa denies having a juvenile violation history in California and records show he does not 
have one in Utah. Considering his adult record, this is surprising, causing the subject to 
voluntarily explain, ul didn't start drinking until I was eighteen and that's when I started getting 
into trouble." 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant and Utah State Juvenile Court 
ADULT RECORD: 
DATE AGENCY OFFENSE DISPOSITION 
4-14-89 CAMC-Ontario, CA Obst/Resist P.O. Convicted Misd-Probation 
6-25-89 SO-San Bern, CA Battery w/Serious Bodily Convicted Misd-Jail 
Injury 
9-27-89 SO-San Bern, CA Hit & Run-Prop Damage Not reported 
Obst/Resist P.O. 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
KATOA, ALFRED P. 
ADULT RECORD:(continued) 
DATE AGENCY OFFENSE 
11-9-90 
2-27-91 
4-18-91 
DISPOSITION 
SO-San Bern, CA Assault Deadly Weapon Dismissed 
Burglary, 1st Deg Dismissed 
Vandalism Convicted Misd-180 days & Prob 
PD-SoSLC, UT 
PD-WVC, UT 
Cont Del Minor 
Assault on P.O. 
Resisting Arrest 
Trespassing 
Unknown 
Dismissed (Warrant not served) 
4-5-93 SO-San Bern, CA Obst/Resist P.O 
Battery 
4-14-94 SO-San Bern, CA Battery, 2 counts 
count 
6-18-94 
9-14-94 
9-20-95 
9-4-97 
SO-San Bern, CA Battery 
SO-San Bern, CA Battery 
SO-San Bern, CA Transp Cont Sub 
Poss Cont Sub for Sale 
Inflict Corp Inj Cohab 
Battery 
Vandalism 
PD-SVC, UT Criminal Homicide 
Convicted Misd-Prob/Jail 
Convicted Misd Battery one 
Prob/Jail 
Not reported 
Not reported 
Convicted Inflict Corporal Inj-
Misd; Poss Cont Sub-Misd; 
Battery-Misd, Probation/Jail 
CURRENT OFFENSE 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
UBCI SID#345960, FBI# 737801TA6 & Third District Court records 
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PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT 
KATOA, ALFRED P. 
DRIVING HISTORY: 
No citations found. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
UtahDLD#151847210 
PENDING CASES: 
There are no known pending cases against this defendant. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
UBCI SID#345960, FBI# 737801TA6 & Third District Court records 
PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY: 
Mr. Katoa has been on what he describes as informal, Court probation numerous times in 
California, but never has been on probation supervision of any kind in Utah. 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: 
The defendant, UBCI SID#345960, FBI# 737801TA6 & Third District Court records, and Adult 
Probation and Parole records 
BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: 
Alfred Katoa was born on February 18, 1968 in Tonga, the twelfth of thirteen children of Viliam 
and Lesieli Katoa. At the age of four, the subject came with his parents and several of the 
other children to the U. S., living with an uncle in Coocamonga, California for a couple of 
years, while saving to buy their own home in Etiwanda, California. There, his father worked as 
a machine operator, usually working two full-time jobs, allowing his mother to remain in the 
home as a housewife. The family maintained a lower middle-class lifestyle. At the age of 
sixteen, the subject completed the process to become a naturalized citizen of the U.S. 
